A Comparison of Jenkinson and Schellenberg on Appraisal

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Abstract

Sir Hilary Jenkinson and Theodore R. Schellenberg, the two leading archival theorists in the English-speaking world in the twentieth century, held strikingly different opinions on the subject of the appraisal of archival records. This paper examines their views on the nature of archival records, the reasons for their retention, and the role of the archivist in the appraisal process. It then traces the evolution of their ideas through the subsequent archival discourse on appraisal in order to identify their continued relevance and lasting contributions, particularly in light of the current debates surrounding the management of electronic records.

Sir Hilary Jenkinson and Theodore R. Schellenberg stand as the two foremost twentieth-century thinkers on archival theory and practice. Both responded to the crisis in modern record-keeping practice by writing influential texts on archival theory and principle. They are often placed on opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their theoretical views, and their ideas and personalities did clash: Jenkinson called Schellenberg’s ideas on selection “dangerous”; Schellenberg dismissed Jenkinson as “an old

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fossil.”¹ Nowhere do Jenkinson and Schellenberg seem more divided than over the nature and purpose of archival appraisal. Jenkinson is typically cast as the passive custodian, desirous of keeping everything, while Schellenberg is seen as the less idealistic, more pragmatic interventionist, father of the disposal schedule.² The aim of this paper is to compare the ideas of Jenkinson and Schellenberg on appraisal, with specific focus on their views of the nature of archival records, the reasons for their retention, and the role of the archivist in the appraisal process. Beyond a comparison of their ideas on appraisal, this paper will also seek to trace the evolution of their ideas in the subsequent archival discourse in an attempt to identify their lasting contributions and continued relevance to the debate on appraisal in archival theory.

Jenkinson on Archives

Jenkinson’s most famous work on archival theory and practice, the Manual of Archive Administration, arose largely out of the numerous challenges posed by the masses of records that had been produced during the course of the First World War.³ The task that Jenkinson set for himself, was to study the nature and characteristics of archival documents in order to come to some fundamental understanding of archival principles that could, in turn, guide the creation of


³ Sir Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration (London: Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., 1937), 20. Jenkinson writes, “The fact is that the enormous stock of fresh experience which has been accumulated during the War and which will be material for the work of the future historian, not to mention students in other branches of learning, is hidden in a mass of documents so colossal that the question of their housing alone (apart from those of their handling, sifting and use) presents quite novel features. . . . it is largely the addition of this abnormal mass of new Archive matter to our existing collections which compels us to face the fact that we must make at any rate a beginning of settling our Archive problems.” The notion, sometimes advanced, that unlike Schellenberg, Jenkinson was relatively insensible to the masses of modern documentation (see, for example, Richard Stapleton, “Jenkinson and Schellenberg: A Comparison,” Archivaria 17 [Winter 1983–84]: 76; Felix Hull, “Appraisal: Problems and Pitfalls,” Journal of the Society of Archivists 6 [April 1980]: 288; and Terry Cook, “What Is Past Is Prologue,” 26 wherein Jenkinson is presented as happily pottering about with old records, insensible to the crush of modern records which was only realized by Schellenberg and his generation) is belied by the above passage and the fact that Jenkinson notes that the records produced during the war were estimated to be of equal bulk to all the records then currently housed at the Public Record Office (Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 20, n.1). The great irony is that the very records which prompted Jenkinson to examine the problems of bulk and archival appraisal had their ultimate disposition settled by German bombs: 60% of the records of the First World War were destroyed in the Blitz. <http://www.nas.gov.uk/miniframe/fact_sheet/military.pdf> (December 4, 2002).
the archives of the present and the future. In his definition of archives, Jenkinson stressed their custodial history, their organic structure, and their accumulation through natural processes:

A document which may be said to belong to the class of Archives is one which was drawn up or used in the course of an administrative or executive transaction (whether public or private) of which itself formed a part; and subsequently preserved in their own custody for their own information by the person or persons responsible for that transaction and their legitimate successors.

Jenkinson argued that the manner in which archives were created, that is, their natural accumulation during the course of regular activities, as opposed to their having been “singled out for preservation,” and their creation and preservation by their creators for their own particular use without consideration as to their future use, endowed archives with the qualities of impartiality and authenticity. These qualities, in turn, gave to archives their particular value as evidence of the past. Jenkinson also realized that archives were composed of interrelated records, and that it was this contextual whole which imparted meaning and which required preservation. The archivist’s chief duty, therefore, was the physical and moral defence of the records’ integrity, impartiality, authenticity and their resultant “archive value.”

The necessary corollary was that any alteration or destruction of records resulted in both a diminution of their integrity and of their value as impartial evidence of the past. The seemingly irreconcilable dilemma posed by the necessity of having to select from amongst the “hopeless unwieldiness” of modern records those worthy of preservation without lessening the “archive value” of the whole was characterized by Jenkinson as follows:

Can we, faced with these modern accumulations, leave any longer to chance the question what Archives are to be preserved? Can we on the other hand attempt to regulate them without destroying that precious characteristic of impartiality which results . . . from the very fact that their preservation was settled either by pure chance or at least by considerations which did not include the possible requirements of future Historians?

4 “The first aim of this book must, it seems, be twofold. It is required to lay down in outline a plan of our duties to the Archives which have been left us by the past; a plan that shall be conditioned entirely by their own fundamental characteristics. From this first process we are to draw certain general principles of Archive values which we may attempt to apply to a new problem, the direction, without altering their Archive character, of the formation of the Archives of the future.” (Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 22).


7 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 146.

8 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 22.

Jenkinson’s response was ultimately determined by his views as to the nature and purpose of archives, views that consistently led him to deny the archivist an active role in the selection of archives or to sanction the destruction of archives after their receipt into archival custody.

Schellenberg on Archives

Much like Jenkinson, Theodore Schellenberg was compelled to write his manual on archival theory and practice, *Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques*, by concerns surrounding the volume of modern records production. In certain respects, it was also written as a rebuttal to Jenkinson’s *Manual*, which Schellenberg considered both “unreadable” and responsible for giving many, particularly the Australians, “a wrong start in their archival work.” Schellenberg had long believed in the limited applicability of European archival practice to the realities of modern records production in the United States, and his text was generally accepted as an exposition of the new manner in which archives should be administered.

However, Schellenberg’s conception of archives was, in many respects, not a complete departure from traditional theory: he argued for the organic nature of archives being responsible for much of their significance, and he upheld the centrality of the principle of respect des fonds. Schellenberg also agreed that archives were created in the course of activities to accomplish specific purposes, and that “such records should be kept in their entirety without mutilation, alter-
ation or unauthorized destruction.”\(^{14}\) What distinguished modern records from ancient archives, however, and what necessitated new archival theory and principles, was their sheer bulk.\(^{15}\) Schellenberg cites “the practical need of improving governmental efficiency” in the face of ever increasing masses of widely scattered documentation as the “immediate, and obviously the most impelling reason” for the establishment in 1934 of the National Archives of the United States.\(^{16}\)

The theory that Schellenberg developed in response to his environment thus stressed the need to reduce bulk by selecting from among the masses of documentation that which was permanently valuable, and to make this selection intelligently available to researchers.\(^{17}\) Since Schellenberg saw the process of selection as central to the archivist’s role, he also made it central to his definition of archives:

Those records of any public or private institution which are adjudged worthy of permanent preservation for reference and research purposes and which have been deposited or have been selected for deposit in an archival institution.\(^{18}\)

Schellenberg believed that while records were created to serve the needs of their creator, this was not the reason why they were ultimately selected for permanent preservation.\(^{19}\) Rather, records inherently possessed two kinds of value: primary value which related to their usefulness as evidence for the creator, and secondary value which related to their historic and cultural functions for those other than the creator.\(^{20}\) Secondary value was itself divided into two properties: evidential value, which provided evidence of the manner in which agencies organized themselves and carried out their mandated functions, and informational value which related to specific subjects dealt with by particular agencies, “persons, corporate bodies, problems, conditions.”\(^{21}\) Indeed, for Schellenberg, the act of selection for permanent retention based on the eval-


\(^{15}\) “A reduction in the quantity of such public records is essential to both the government and the scholar. A government cannot afford to keep all the records that are produced as a result of its multifarious activities. It cannot provide space to house them or staff to care for them. The costs of maintaining them are beyond the means of the most opulent nation. Nor are scholars served by maintaining all of them. Scholars cannot find their way through the huge quantities of modern public records. The records must be reduced in quantity to make them useful for scholarly research.” Theodore R. Schellenberg, “The Appraisal of Modern Public Records,” *National Archives Bulletin* 8 (Washington, D.C., 1956), 5.


\(^{17}\) Stapleton, “Jenkinson and Schellenberg: A Comparison,” 76.

\(^{18}\) Schellenberg, *Modern Archives*, 16.


uation of secondary values was ultimately responsible for transforming records into archives.22

**Jenkinson and Schellenberg on Appraisal**

In order to better understand the differing views of Jenkinson and Schellenberg with regard to appraisal, a closer study of their perspectives on three important theoretical issues will be made: the nature of records and archives, the reason for the preservation of archival material, and the role of the archivist in appraisal.

According to Schellenberg, there is a distinct difference between records and archives. Records are defined as:

All books, papers, maps, photographs, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any public or private institution in pursuance of its legal obligations or in connection with the transaction of its proper business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that institution or its legitimate successor as evidence of its functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities or because of the informational value of the data contained therein.23

What is immediately striking about this definition of records is its similarity in principle to Jenkinson’s definition of archives. Schellenberg conceived of archives as a separate “species of records”24 and his definition of archives was an attempt to narrow the more traditional definition by emphasizing the fact that archives are distinct precisely because they have been adjudged worthy of permanent preservation for reasons other than those for which they were originally created, that is, for reference and research purposes.25

For Jenkinson there is no such definitive and transformative point at which records become archives, and this is not only because, terminologically, Jenkinson considered records and archives synonymous. For Jenkinson, archival documents were created when “having ceased to be in current use, they [documents] are definitely set aside for preservation, tacitly adjudged worthy

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22 Schellenberg writes, “Admittedly, the first, or primary reason why most records are preserved is to accomplish the purpose for which they were created and accumulated . . . They [records] must be preserved for another reason to be archives, and this reason is a cultural one. They are preserved for use by bodies other than those that created them, as well as by their creators” (Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 14).

23 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 16.


of being kept.”

Jenkinson’s tacit judgment is not Schellenberg’s value-determined selection, however, but refers to the fact that every archival document had been “selected” by virtue of the fact that “someone decided to stick it into a file rather than the bin.”

What transformed the record into an archival record was the fact that the record had been set aside and preserved, not based on any notion as to their potential future value, but during the course of activities for the creator’s own purposes. Indeed, there is a sense in Jenkinson’s writings that, far from determined selection, a certain degree of chance is necessary for the creation of ‘proper’ archives: records emerge often by “pure chance” from “a kind of cocoon stage” of neglect, after which, “if they survive,” they reach a point where they are once again consulted and “their value for the purposes of Research is recognized and becomes the governing factor in their preservation.”

The important distinction is that Jenkinson’s tacit judgment is part of the creator’s affairs and the reasons for retention or destruction are entirely their own, while Schellenberg advocates selection based on the value of records for perceived research needs of those other than the creator. Jenkinson was adamant that not only could personal bias not be eliminated from a process designed to select the “important” and destroy the “valueless,” but that such a process was ultimately a misguided effort since it was impossible to anticipate the research interests and requirements of the future:

Let it be said at once that the title to these notes is not to be taken either as condoning by implication the destruction of Records or as suggesting that any qualities of scholarship or experience will make it possible for anyone to ‘choose’ with certainty out of a mass of Records those which future historians will find most useful.

Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 8–9. Schellenberg could not resist citing Jenkinson’s “tacit judgement” in support of his own view of the role of selection in the creation of archives, writing: “It is interesting to note that, in his subsequent discussion of how documents become archives, Jenkinson, though primarily concerned with the archives of the past, foreshadows the views of archivists concerned with modern records when he claims that records become archives when ‘having ceased to be in current use, they are definitely set aside for preservation, tacitly adjudged worthy of being kept.’ It is quite obvious that modern archives are kept for the use of others than those that created them, and that conscious decisions must be made as to their value for such use.” Jenkinson replied that this was an unfortunate “slip” on Schellenberg’s part, which required “no more than a mild remonstrance.” (Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 13–14; Jenkinson, “Modern Archives: Some Reflections on T.R. Schellenberg,” 340, n.1.)


Jenkinson, “Classification and Survey of English Archives,” Selected Writings, 197; Jenkinson, “The English Archivist: A New Profession,” Selected Writings, 240. In fact, for Jenkinson, it seems that only this kind of disregard for their long-term preservation completely satisfies archival documents’ claim to authenticity.

Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 144–45. In discussing the appraisal of ancient archives, Jenkinson comments on “the difficulties that arise when the Archivist and the Historian are given what amounts to a share in the creation of those Archives which it is their true business only to keep and to use respectively.” Jenkinson also raises the possibility that, in the future, historians may not even be the primary users of archives (Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 149).

Jenkinson particularly disputed the ability of historians to impartially advise in the selection of records, arguing that their own research interests would inevitably influence their decisions with regard to which records possessed long-term value. Schellenberg’s view is diametrically opposed, for he sees as the archivist’s greatest asset the fact that they are “generally trained as historians,” making them “competent to ascertain the historical values of public records.” Schellenberg does not, however, suggest that the archivist must be omniscient with regards to research, for he encourages the solicitation of the professional historian’s and other social science researchers’ opinions as to the research value of records.

As a result of their different opinions with regard to the nature of archives and the reasons for their preservation, Jenkinson and Schellenberg thus arrive at very different selection criteria. By virtue of the principle of moral defense, the only people whom Jenkinson considered capable of legitimately destroying records are the creators of the records themselves:

. . . for an Administrative body to destroy what it no longer needs is a matter entirely within its competence and an action which future ages (even though they may find reason to deplore it) cannot possibly criticize as illegitimate or as affecting the status of the remaining Archives.

While reluctant to intrude into this process, Jenkinson does recommend guidelines for selection which stress the functional utility of documents: worthy of preservation are those documents “which were in their time the essential ones for office work” and which preserve “a Record of what the business, or institution, or individual in question was engaged upon.” This is similar to what Jenkinson referred to as the “Golden Rule”: the administrator should ensure that the papers are in such a manner of “completeness and order,” meaning specifically that neither too many nor too few of its important documents were preserved, that if, by some accident, the entire office staff were “obliterated,” a successor could enter the office and carry on the work “with the least possible inconvenience.”

31 Jenkinson, *A Manual of Archive Administration*, 146–47. Interestingly, Hans Booms draws the very same conclusion, commenting on the downfall of his committees whose task was to review the documentation plan: “In appraisal matters, they [the historians] always tend to consider those records which are the most useful to their own research as the most important.” (Hans Booms, “Überlieferungsbildung: Keeping Archives as a Social and Political Activity,” *Archivaria* 33 [Winter 1991–92]: 29).


33 The somewhat troublesome proviso accompanying this was that the administration must carry on its record management according to its practical business needs, without being affected in its decisions by the consideration that it was actively producing historical records (Jenkinson, *A Manual of Archive Administration*, 149–50).


imagined that the archivist would take into custody well-ordered and “properly formed” archives, not masses of disorganized documentation. Towards the end of his career, Jenkinson reluctantly admitted that the “ultimate intrusion of selection based on the interests of research is inevitable.” However, he remained adamant that this selection process was not the task of the archivist whose role as “Keeper of Archives is still, as Sir Thomas Hardy once put it, to keep them.”

Initially, Schellenberg’s selection criteria seems in many respects similar to Jenkinson’s. In his discussion of evidential value, Schellenberg writes that the bare minimum which must be preserved are those records which illustrate the manner in which an agency was organized and which reflect its patterns of action, its policies, procedures, and achievements. Essentially, these are the records by which government can be held accountable for its actions. In practice, Schellenberg assumes that evidential value increases in relation to the creating agency’s position within the administrative hierarchy, but selection can only proceed once the broad administrative context within which the records were created is understood. Of these records which contain evidential value, those which are most worthy of retention are those which record the origins of the agency, illustrate its structure, and document its substantive functions.

Records are, however, also appraised on the basis of their informational value, and here Schellenberg makes a distinct departure from Jenkinson. Informational value is devoid of provenancial context, it is determined on a piecemeal basis and is only concerned with the content of records as these relate to persons, places, and phenomena. Appraisal for informational value is thus concerned with research needs and methodologies, but its practical utility is somewhat undermined by Schellenberg’s argument that the great bulk of records precludes such careful, piecemeal appraisal. Nevertheless, by employing both evidential and informational value standards to appraisal,

36 Jenkinson is often misinterpreted on this point. In wartime Italy, his instructions about what warranted preservation left one army officer to question, “Say, does that mean we’ve got to protect the invoices in the drug-store on the corner?” Henry E. Bell, “Archivist Itinerant: Jenkinson in Wartime Italy,” Essays in Memory of Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ed. Albert E.J. Hollaender (Society of Archivists, 1962), 176.


39 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 142.


41 “In appraising the value of such information in public records, we are not concerned with the source of the records—what agency created them, or what activities resulted in their creation. The only thing that matters is the information that is in them. Informational values can therefore be appraised piecemeal, for the records are judged solely on the basis of their content and not on their relation to other records produced by an agency. Such appraisals depend on a professional knowledge of research resources, research needs, and research methods as distinct from the specialized knowledge of administrative background that is required to make appraisals of ‘evidential’ values” (Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 148).
Schellenberg is able to be at times both very specific and fairly general in describing records worthy of preservation. Indeed, Schellenberg’s vision of the scope of records’ potential representative value is incredibly broad, admitting to the limitless scope of records for research purposes:

[Archives] are chosen, not on the basis of a consideration of particular records by themselves, but because of their significance in the entire documentation of a particular subject, or activity, or, more broadly, in the documentation of an agency, or a government, or even a society at some stage of its development.\(^{42}\) [italics added]

What, then, is the role of the archivist in the appraisal of records? Jenkinson’s solution to the dilemma of reducing bulk through selection while simultaneously upholding the moral defense of archives was, at least superficially, to abdicate responsibility: destruction by its very nature is anti-archival. The duty of the archivist is the protection of archive quality and any selection of documents undertaken by the archivist, or the historian, compromises the impartiality of the record by importing “into the collection . . . what we have been throughout most anxious to keep out of it,” namely, “an element of his personal judgment.”\(^{43}\)

Jenkinson was not, however, insensible to the fact that action needed to be taken to reduce the bulk of archives, and neither did he imagine that archivists could entirely abdicate responsibility for appraisal. Realistically, Jenkinson acknowledged that appraisal decisions were made by archivists, but he viewed it a “disagreeable task”: selection is a diminution of the value of archives and runs the risk of reducing them to mere “Collections . . . a fact which . . . should be continually in the mind of the Archivist: informing the manner in which he carries out, when he must, the act of selection and restraining him from that act whenever it can be avoided.”\(^{44}\) Pressed by the demand for paper salvage in the Second World War, and eager to avoid the wide-scale destruction of archives that occurred during the First World War, Jenkinson nonetheless authored several bulletins outlining the role of the archivist in “encouraging intelligent elimination, as well as preservation.”\(^{45}\) Jenkinson’s criteria for selection, however, was limited to current office documents, and explicitly stated that “Records [archival documents] ought not to be destroyed.”\(^{46}\)

Instead, bulk needed to be addressed at the point of creation, prior to the transformation of office documents into records. This was the duty of


\(^{45}\) Jenkinson, “British Archives and the War,” *Selected Writings*, 228.

Jenkinson’s administrator, the precursor to the records management officer, whose responsibilities were to ensure the preservation of “a convenient form of artificial memory” through the retention of as little documentation as possible, all organized and arranged in a convenient form for the archivist.47 The role of the archivist is essentially an advisory one, encouraging the establishment of record-keeping rules, such as the re-imposition of central registration and the regular appraisal and transfer of records through records scheduling.48 Indeed, in some cases, Jenkinson is even reluctant to ascribe to the archivist this advisory function, suggesting instead some unnamed “competent authority” for this role.49 Desirous not to influence the creation of the historical record, and thus impair its impartiality, authenticity, and value as evidence, Jenkinson ultimately maintains a passive role towards records creation and a somewhat distant relationship to the creator and the process of appraising current records. Schellenberg’s position is very clear and is virtually the opposite: the archivist is by definition “the professional who selects documents used for administrative purposes and preserves them, mainly for scholarly use.”50 Schellenberg had no such misgivings about the archivist actively participating in the appraisal process, both in terms of acting as a moderator between the record’s creator and the scholarly community,51 as well as with regard to working in close partnership with current records managers. Like Jenkinson, Schellenberg realized that the problem of bulk needed to be addressed at the point of creation, if not earlier. But unlike Jenkinson, Schellenberg saw no reason why the archivist’s relationship with the records manager should be at arms length, their interests and aims were so intimately linked that they demanded close cooperation. Records management was so important to Schellenberg that fully one quarter of Modern Archives is devoted to the subject.52

Schellenberg and Jenkinson thus had very different views of the nature of archives which Schellenberg classed as a separate group of records and which Jenkinson considered an organic extension of office documents, archives being essentially records in archival custody. Schellenberg argued that archives were kept primarily for reasons unrelated to their creator’s interests, primarily for

49 Jenkinson, “British Records After the War,” Selected Writings, 212.
50 Livelton, Archival Theory, Records and the Public, 67.
52 See Modern Archives, Part II, ca. 80 pages. Ernst Posner argued that it was in this bringing together of the concerns, objectives, and techniques of the management of current records with those of the archivist that Schellenberg really “broke new ground.” “In Memoriam,” American Archivist 33 (April 1970): 195.
their informational and evidential values in fulfilling potential research needs. Jenkinson was adamant that selection resulted in the diminution of archive quality, and that archives were not kept for research purposes but for reasons relating to their creator’s administrative and legal requirements; their value for historical research was an unintentional but fortuitous by-product of their preservation. Finally, Schellenberg saw the archivist as an interventionist, selecting documents for preservation and working closely with records managers and current records.53 Jenkinson maintained a more passive stance, advising on issues of selection and records scheduling, but opposed to engaging in the task of appraising archives.

The Archival Discourse on Appraisal

The changes that the archival community has undergone since the publication of Schellenberg’s Modern Archives have been numerous. A fundamental change has been the reinterpretation of the function of archives in society through the concept of documentation strategy. In the 1970s, Hans Booms and Gerald Ham began to argue for a broader role for archives; rejecting narrow acquisition policies, they argued instead that the archivist’s task should be to preserve as complete and faithful a picture of the whole of society as possible. While documentation strategists grappled with questions of methodology, more recent changes, such as freedom of information legislation and the electronic information revolution, have occasioned a “neo-Jenkinsonian” institutionally focused revival whose concerns are primarily those of accountability and the role of archives as guarantors of individual rights in democratic society. As questions about the fundamental nature and purpose of archives were raised, so too, necessarily, were questions about appraisal. And in many ways, the questions that archivists raised were essentially the same as those debated by Jenkinson and Schellenberg: what is the nature of archival records? How do we decide which records to keep? What is the role of the archivist in appraisal?

Documentation strategy was largely born of dissatisfaction with traditional history-based appraisal methodologies as articulated in Schellenberg’s evidential and informational values. Ham wrote that basing appraisal on research interests resulted in narrow documentation that was biased, incapable of reflecting the true diversity of society, and resulted in the archivist being “nothing more than a weathervane moved by the changing winds of

53 This close relationship between records management and archives is, of course, not just because of Schellenberg’s influence. The United States already had records management programs in place for federal agencies after the passage in 1950 of the Federal Records Act, and the National Archives was itself the “National Archives and Record Service.” Nancy E. Peace, “Deciding What to Save: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice,” Archival Choices: Managing the Historical Record in an Age of Abundance, ed. Nancy E. Peace (Lexington, Mass. and Toronto: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1984), 3.
historiography.”

Booms agreed with both Ham and Jenkinson, writing that appraisal based on future research needs, what he called “archival futurology,” was impossible “since it required archivists to be clairvoyants.” While documentation strategists thus rejected Schellenberg’s research driven values as appraisal tools, they did not embrace Jenkinson, whose ideas on appraisal they considered too passive and narrowly focused to effectively contribute to creating a representative documentary heritage. Having rejected appraisal criteria based on Schellenberg’s historical research and Jenkinson’s administrative and legal accountability, documentation strategists needed to devise new appraisal criteria in order to identify records that had enduring value.

Booms argued that such value was not inherent in records, but resulted from an imposition of value judgments that reflected both personal opinion and larger societal or cultural attitudes. Since society itself decided what it considered valuable and deserving of inclusion in the documentary record, it was ultimately the task of society itself to appraise the value of archives. While Booms struggled with a practical methodology to implement these ideas, he ultimately settled on provenance: what society deems significant can only be divined “indirectly through research into the functions of those key creators designated by society to realize its needs and wishes.” Booms thus turned his attention to the importance of the creator in society as a means of judging the value of its records to the documentary heritage. In Canada, the writings on appraisal by Hugh Taylor and Terry Cook also advocated a shift away from content and towards context. The shift from physical artifact to intellectual purpose was meant to provide a new model for appraisal that would focus not on

the search for research value per se, but rather the articulation of the most important societal structures, functions, records creators, and records-creating processes, and their interaction, which together form a comprehensive reflection of human experience.

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56 Cook, “Past is Prologue,” 30.
58 Booms initial plan had been to study public opinion polls and social dynamics in order to determine what society viewed as important, but this plan was ultimately abandoned as unworkable (Cook, “What Is Past Is Prologue,” 30).
This macro-appraisal approach shifted focus to the societal context within which records are created in order to capture those functions, programs, and activities of records creators that interact with and influence society as a whole.60

A similar approach was advocated by Helen Samuels in the United States through her institutional functional analysis. Samuels’ idea was that in order to fairly and properly document society, archivists needed to identify what records were and were not being produced by particular creators or societal phenomena whose inclusion in the documentary heritage was considered important. The approach required “knowledge of what is to be documented,” which was gained through careful study of the purpose and functional structure of the particular institution to be documented. Samuels also dismissed Schellenberg’s research use as a criterion for appraisal, calling any such attempts “subjective guesses about potential research.” Instead, guided by “clearer documentary objectives based on a thorough understanding of the phenomena or institution,” the best the archivist could do was “document institutions as adequately as possible” in the hopes of thereby answering any potential future inquiries.61

Documentation strategists considered their approach revolutionary, but in many ways it was both implicitly and explicitly still firmly tied to Schellenberg’s conception of archival value.62 The shift in focus from record to provenance did not solve the problem of identifying value, it merely shifted the level at which relative importance was to be determined. It did not alter the fact that it remained a value judgment, nor did it answer the question “important or significant provenance in relation to what?”63 As Luciana Duranti points out:

Any attribution of value . . . is inescapably directed to content, even when it is carried out on the basis of provenance . . . because the assumption on which it is based is that good provenance equals good content.64

In fact, documentation strategies are really only Schellenberg’s evidential and informational values, with “societal importance” replacing “historical

research” as the grounds for preservation, extended to a broader spectrum of society; it is “old wine in new skins.”

Those whom Cook refers to as “neo-Jenkinsonians” suggest another method of appraisal, one that rejects Schellenbergian particularism and restates Jenkinson’s conception of the universal nature of archival records. That is, given the fundamental characteristics of impartiality, authenticity, uniqueness, naturalness, and interrelatedness as identified by Jenkinson, it is impossible to select archives for preservation based on the attribution of value, for such selection violates each of these characteristics. Rather than focusing on Schellenberg’s concept of the informational value of archives, this view stresses their juridical and evidentiary roles in providing administrative, legal and historical accountability for both the creator and for society as a whole. Rather than attempting to engineer an ultimately subjective “comprehensive record of the past,” it is felt that this objective is best served by “respecting rather than controlling the past.” The recommendation is essentially that made by the Grigg Report: by preserving the records important for primary purposes (those essential in order to fulfill an agency’s functions, to meet accountability requirements, or those “of enduring evidentiary usefulness”) any subsequent secondary, or historical, purposes can be adequately met. This approach, wherein the creator makes appraisal decisions during the course of affairs based on the creator’s particular juridical-administrative functions and responsibilities, is the only method that ensures the impartiality and evidentiary quality of the record:

If selection is one of the mechanisms embedded in the routines and procedures accompanying the creation, maintenance, and use of the documents, and/or it is based on the functionality of the documents and their aggregations . . . the meaning of the whole is not reduced or changed but is concen-

65 This broadening of perspective was something that Schellenberg himself advocated: “Diverse judgements [of informational value] will spread the burden of preserving the documentation of a country among its various archival institutions, making one preserve what another may discard. Diverse judgements, in a word, may well assure a more adequate social documentation.” (Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 149.) Nancy Peace also comments that Schellenberg’s evidential and informational values really have two distinct goals: evidential value is narrow and relates to the history and operation of a particular institution, while informational value is broad and relates to all people and society as a whole (Peace, “Deciding What to Save,” 9).

66 Completing the metaphor, Boles notes that “unfortunately, the archival folk lore suggests that the vintage was not very good to start with.” Frank Boles, “Commentary,” American Archivist 51 (Winter and Spring 1988): 46.


But do the recommendations in the Grigg Report result in adequate documentation? Does “a good administrative memory . . . serve as the foundation of all other societal memory making?”

Ham’s indictment of Jenkinson reads: “Allowing the creator to designate what should be the archival record solves the problems of complexity, impermanence, and volume of contemporary records by ignoring them.” This is the traditional complaint against Jenkinson’s passivity made by, among others, W. Kaye Lamb and Ian Maclean, who wrote: “I feel that the Archivist must take a leading role in selection or elimination because, if he does not, it is likely that nobody will.” Ham, however, extended the role of the archivist to that of “a historical reporter for his own time,” an idea that is also contained in Samuels’ suggestion that archivists themselves should actively create records where gaps in the adequate documentation of society exist.

The neo-Jenkinsonians recognize that the archivist must intervene to a certain degree in the formation of records, especially in an electronic environment, in order to ensure that records that properly document an organization’s functions and responsibilities are being made and preserved. The archivist must not, however, act as creator or historian, for as Jenkinson repeatedly warns, archives are valuable precisely because they have not been created for posterity. The archivist must instead come to be seen as a valuable asset to the records’ creators themselves by identifying what records need to be preserved and how best these records are to be managed by the administration itself for the administration’s purposes. Essentially, the archivist must “develop the unified perspective [which] the administrator lacks.” While the role of the archivist thus remains that of advisor, mediator, and custodian, carrying out these duties has necessitated a greater degree of intervention than Jenkinson

72 F. Gerald Ham, Selecting and Appraising Archives and Manuscripts (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1992), 9. In “The Archival Edge,” Ham compares the New York City archivist whose appraisal criteria is exclusively related to the mayor’s office and potential legal suits by and against the city to Jenkinsonian theory, which seems a rather unfair depiction (Ham, “The Archival Edge,” 7).
74 Ham, “The Archival Edge,” 9. The phrase is not Ham’s but is originally Sam Bass Warner’s.
75 Samuels, “Improving Our Disposition,” 134.
could have foreseen. Despite Jenkinson’s principled objections, archivists have become deeply implicated in the process of appraisal, if only because the scale of record production demands intervention if “the viability of historical archives as memory inducing documentary heritage” is to be maintained. This role can still be compatible with Jenkinson’s views, however, so long as the archivist, acting as “facilitator of public memory making and keeping,” can strike the proper balance between those who create and those who use archives.

More than anything else, the advent of electronic record-keeping systems has focused the debate on appraisal, and perhaps ironically, has led to the revitalization of Jenkinsonian principles in North America. The transient and fluid nature of electronic records, their lack of fixity as compared to the printed page, their dependence on technology and their rapid obsolescence, led Taylor to remark that in many respects we are returning to a “pre-Gutenberg environment.” The need for the archivist’s intervention in an electronic environment is essential, for passivity in this respect may well result in records either not being preserved at all, or if preserved, being technologically irretrievable. The fundamental debate over how to appraise records and what the role of the archivist should be in appraisal has not changed, only the fragility and time-sensitive nature of electronic records has made the resolution of the issue a more pressing concern.

In the debate over how best to manage and preserve electronic records, similar theoretical divisions to those that exist with respect to archival appraisal are evident. On the one hand are the neo-Jenkinsonians, who stress the continuity of archival theory, and who admit that while electronic records pose unique challenges, they are not fundamentally different from other types of records. This view stresses appraisal at the source of creation based on the juridical and administrative needs of the creator, and undertaken by the creator with the assistance and advice of the archivist. On the other hand are the post-custodialists, who see the electronic record as so completely diff-

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78 The Grigg Report recommended that creators appraise their records at regular intervals, when memory as to their immediate usefulness was still fresh, and again at a later date in conjunction and with the advice of archivists. This essentially Jenkinsonian view, wherein archivists act at a remove through consultation and advice on records scheduling, continues to define English archival practice. The operating principle is that of moveable responsibility, where care of the record migrates during the life-cycle of the record from records manager to archivist, with the archivist acting as final arbiter (Report of the Committee on Departmental Records, 30; Hull, “Appraisal: Problems and Pitfalls,” 287–91). In certain important respects, however, Hull is not an orthodox Jenkinsonian, for he advocates seeking expert advice from academics with regard to appraisal decisions. See page 289 of “Appraisal: Problems and Pitfalls.”


ferent that its proper management requires a dramatic shift in archival practice, even to the point of relinquishing custodial control over the record. This view favors close cooperation with records managers and bases appraisal not on the record itself, but on the wider societal context within which the record is created.

One result of the electronic revolution has been the abandonment of Schellenberg’s distinction between records and archives. The distinction which arose, perhaps unintentionally, that records were the exclusive concern of records managers and archives of archivists, was increasingly recognized as problematic in an electronic environment that required archival intervention at the point where records were still current, or indeed, at a point prior to their creation. Electronic records emphasize the fact that documents exist along a continuum of creation, use and preservation, and that a distinction between records and archives “distracts from their common unifying purpose as ‘archival documents.’” This reinterpretation has also been influenced by access to information legislation which has tended to shift the focus of archival responsibility away from preserving records for historical purposes, and towards an emphasis on the role of archives in ensuring accountability through the record. The rediscovery of the discipline of diplomatics in North America has also been responsible for a reinterpretation of the archival record that emphasizes the juridical-administrative role which archives play in society. The post-custodialist view, as expressed by David Bearman and Cook, argues that not only is the cost of managing and preserving electronic records, which involves software and hardware issues and requires the continual migration of records, prohibitively expensive for archives, but it is not ultimately necessary. Archivists instead should abandon their role as custodians and become:

. . . managers of corporate behaviour towards archival information resources, regulating the disposition of information just as auditors and personnel officers manage behaviour towards other corporate assets.

The post-custodial view of archives sees them as “access hubs” or “virtual archives without walls,” which allow users to connect to records that would continue to be maintained by their creators within their original electronic environments. The role of the archivist would be to work together with the records manager in identifying the records that are significant both for “institutional

corporate memory” and the broader documentation of society. As Eastwood points out, however, the physical custody of archival material remains essential for guaranteeing an uncorrupted and intelligible record of the past, and in terms of ensuring accountability for both institutions and for society as a whole.

Ultimately, the post-custodial view remains closely allied to documentation strategy, retaining the notion of selection by the archivist on what remain essentially subjective grounds. Despite its acknowledgement of the role of archives as instruments for ensuring institutional accountability, post-custodialists are unwilling to relinquish the role of creatorship which is implicit in the act of selection. This position, however, is untenable, for either archivists are “protectors of evidence” or else they are “creator’s of archival value,” but they cannot be both. Nor is the post-custodial advocacy of close cooperation with records managers anything new: Schellenberg argued for the joint appraisal of current records by archivists and record managers, out of which the practice of scheduling resulted. Jenkinson, too, advocated cooperation with current records administrators in helping to identify those records which were of continuing evidentiary value for the creator.

The central dilemma remains: what is to be the role of the archivist in appraisal? In trying to come to some conclusion, it is useful to look back to the escalation of modern bureaucracy and the issues facing Jenkinson in the 1920s that, in a sense, is where the debate about archival appraisal began. In discussing the dramatic increase in modern bureaucratic documentation, Jenkinson lamented the disappearance of the central registry. In his view, the proliferation of documentation that resulted from ignorance or misuse of proper documentary form and superfluous copying could be remedied by the re-imposition of centralized control. This central registry would control the materials upon which documents intended for permanent preservation would be printed, it would establish forms for capturing events which occurred without leaving a documentary trace, such as telephone conversations, and it would have the final say over records’ disposition. These goals were rightly dismissed as inefficient and unrealistic in the large, modern, paper-based bureaucracies. However, in the electronic environment, it is precisely the re-imposition of cen-

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entralized control by means of electronic recordkeeping systems, through registration and profiling for example, which is increasingly being seen as essential for preserving the authenticity, integrity, and reliability of the electronic record. In a sense, the revolution in electronic recordkeeping has allowed for the ideal Jenkinsonian registry to be created.

Terry Cook’s opinion is that Jenkinson’s views on appraisal are “no longer valid for modern records or for modern society’s expectations of what archives should do,” even though his spirited defense of evidential value remains “inspirational.”93 Until recently, Jenkinson’s conception of archives as primarily evidential rather than informational found little acceptance in North America, with the exception of the writings of Margaret Cross Norton, where it was overshadowed by Schellenberg’s promotion of archives as historical and cultural centers, and of the archivist as appraiser.94 Yet for all his emphasis on historical use and secondary value for preservation, Schellenberg himself admitted that the identification of records of “importance” was a task that resided “in the realm of the imponderable.”95 Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between Jenkinson and Schellenberg, with a realization that appraisal must be based on the needs of the creator in fulfilling their own administrative and legal functions, but that an archives which preserved only those records created by governmental or organizational bureaucracies would fail to meet our expectations of the role which archives have come to play in providing a sense of national and cultural history. After all the time which has elapsed since Jenkinson’s Manual of Archive Administration and Schellenberg’s Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques were published, the questions they raised still dominate the discussion on archival appraisal and, despite dissenting opinion, both continue to provide relevant contributions to that debate.


94 Duranti, “The Concept of Appraisal,” 338. At a meeting of the American Historical Association, Margaret Cross Norton spoke of “the archivist’s primary responsibilities” which were “the promotion of administrative efficiency and the protection of individual rights, rather than the facilitating of historical scholarship” (Raymond and O’Toole, “Up From the Basement,” 18). It should be noted, however, that a 1955 paperwork management report presented to Congress largely endorsed the findings of the Grigg Report (Peace, “Deciding What to Save,” 9).